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CURRENT IDF, AMF TRANSACTIONS DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English 1 Aug 81 p 57

[Text]

THE ISLAMIC development bank, a branch of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, is to grant more than \$95.2m in credits to various Islamic countries.

The Jeddah-based bank gave Algeria \$18m in credit to purchase industrial goods, while Pakistan received \$16m to buy vessels for its new state tanker company. Other credits included \$15m to Bangladesh for cotton imports and a similar sum to Senegal to buy sunflower seeds. North Yemen received \$10m towards the purchase of petroleum products. Syria, the Maldives, Niger and Cameroon also received credits from the IDB.

The bank's council, chaired by the president, Dr. Ahmed Mohammed Ali, also agreed to increase the bank's financial contribution to the Jordanian Fertiliser Company. The bank is speeding up the programme to fund a research and training institute which will foster the principles of Islamic banking throughout the Muslim world. It was also announced that the bank's foreign trade financing would be opened up to large private placements.

By the end of last year the IDB had committed \$347.1m in financing foreign trade operations, \$49.4m in loans and technical assistance and a further \$651m in miscellaneous investment.

Meanwhile, the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) expects to come close to doubling its capital within the next six months to about \$900m, AMF officials have announced. The fund, the Arab world's equivalent of the Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF), exists mainly to help Arab countries with balance of payment difficulties.

Officials say that the amount the fund has committed in loans is expected to reach half its resources in the next two to three weeks and trigger an automatic call on member states to pay up all their capital. The fund's authorised capital is 263m Arab Accounting Dinars (\$890m) but only 52 per cent of that has been paid up. One dinar equals three IMF Special Drawing Rights.

Officials at the fund's headquarters in Abu Dhabi said that a board decision taken last April meant that member states would have six months to pay up after the call for capital. Loans committed at the end of last year were about \$120m, but the loans expected to be approved in the next few weeks would almost double this. The fund, founded by an agency of the Arab League, began in 1977 when the aim of fostering closer economic and monetary cooperation between Arab countries. Its president is Iraq's former planning minister, Jawad Hashim.

Bankers said the increase in the fund's capital would allow it substantially to increase its lending and become more of a force in the Arab world. 'The fund does not directly finance development programmes but tries through lending to correct imbalances in a country's economy.'

An important project now being considered is a clearing system for payments between member countries to pass through a central system, perhaps at the AMF headquarters. The fund is also preparing studies on ways to use the Arab dinar, at present a notional currency used by the AMF, in transactions between Arab countries. Officials are looking at ways of revaluing the dinar by using a basket of currencies rather than the SDR as at present.

ISRAEL COMPLAINS ABOUT EEC LOANS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 3 Aug 81 pp 7, 8

[Text]

The European Economic Community agreed last week to disburse \$1.05 billion in loans and grants to seven Arab countries and Israel over the next five years. Almost \$430 million of this has been earmarked for direct grants to the Arab states, and the remaining \$620 million is in loans to be shared between these countries and Israel. Israeli officials in Brussels have charged the EEC with discrimination against their country, but community sources have retorted that Israel is not a developing country, as are the seven other recipients, and that it has the highest per capita income of the group.

The aid is being granted under current financial protocols linking the EEC with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel.

Egypt gets the lion's share of the latest package with \$133 million in direct grants and \$156 million in loans; Morocco follows next with \$114 million of grants and \$94 million in credits; Algeria receives \$45.6 million of

direct aid and \$112 million in loans; Tunisia's share is \$62.7 million and \$81.7 million respectively. In the Mashrek, the biggest recipient is Syria with \$34.2 million worth of grants and \$66.5 million of loans; Jordan follows with \$27.2 million in grants and loans of \$38 million, while Lebanon gets \$16.7 million in direct aid and \$35.5 million in credits; Israel receives \$41.8 million worth of loans.

The Israeli ambassador to Brussels protested at a news conference that his country was being discriminated against by not receiving any direct grants from the EEC, while countries rich in resources such as Algeria were getting substantially larger loans as well as straight grants. Although there were reports that some EEC governments were sympathetic to the ambassador's arguments, precedent in EEC assistance opposed these because Israel has not been receiving direct grants under the current protocol which expires in December.

CSO: 4300/84

BRIEFS

EUROPEAN LOANS TO ARAB STATES--European Community aid to its major trading partners in the Maghreb and Mashreq will total about EUA 1bn (EUA 1 = \$1.04) over the coming five years. This represents a 40 per cent increase compared with European aid to the seven Arab countries and Israel from 1977 to 1981, but still falls far short of the aid request put in by the recipients, or even the aid figure suggested by the EEC executive commission. The aid will include EUA 600m in loans from the European Investment Bank, the EEC's main lending institution. The interest rate on the loans, estimated at between 13 to 15 per cent per year, is considered much too high even by European experts. Some EUA 415m will be given in the form of grants, with Algeria receiving EUA 44m, Morocco EUA 107m, Tunisia EUA 59m, Egypt EUA 126m, Jordan EUA 27m, Lebanon EUA 15m and Syria EUA 34m. European Commission experts who recommended that grants to the EEC's so-called 'preferential' partners should total about EUA 489m, stress that the final aid figure agreed by European foreign ministers in Brussels recently is 'disappointingly low'. They point out that EEC aid for the next five years barely takes account of inflation. While Italy and France were willing to increase European aid to the Maghreb and Mashreq states, both Germany and the UK are believed to have opposed such moves. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English 1 Aug 81 p 33]

CSO: 4300/84

HARDSHIPS OF SOVIET SOLDIERS DESCRIBED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 27 Jul 81 pp 90-91

[Text] The Soviet citizen can now learn from his newspaper that Moscow is having difficulties in occupied Afghanistan.

The Afghan driver Jalaleddin does not have much sympathy with his compatriots' resistance struggle against the Soviet invasion: "We all hate the bandits," he admitted to the correspondent from the Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, "we are glad that the troops came."

Similar confessions are quite familiar to the readers of Soviet newspapers since their army occupied the neighboring country in December 1979.

However, reading on reveals something unusual: "Earlier, many people thought that the bandits were really fighting for the people." Jalaleddin's opinion apparently changed after the rebels--dismissed in the Soviet Union for a whole year as insignificant individual fighters--attacked his bus.

As the Soviet press reports them, the operations of the rebel groups are hitting the population in the mountains along the Afghan-Pakistani border especially hard: The resistance fighters are blocking the few traffic arteries in the remote parts of the country, they are blowing up bridges and throwing up barricades to hamper the provisioning of the border area with water, gasoline and provisions.

Burning schools and mosques, mined roads, burned out vehicles everywhere, numerous dead and wounded: "We are having difficulties, and not just minor ones," complains Division Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Said Chan of the Afghan army.

Soviet newspapers have recently been painting this gloomy picture in documentaries and reports from the scene in Afghanistan--suddenly the Soviet reader learns that the intervention is meeting with mass resistance. He no longer has to make do with radio reports from the West, with rumors or news about the dead from his circle of acquaintances.

For a year the Soviet press had printed exclusively good news about the occupied country. The army newspaper RED STAR had lost its patience last October with the "desire of the hirelings of imperialism and reaction to intimidate the population by terrorism and to disrupt the economic situation," from which the attentive reader could draw his own conclusions about the seriousness of the situation. But the RED STAR was optimistic: "The enemies have no future."

One and 1/2 years after the Soviet strike on Kabul, the enemies have still not been vanquished: Foreign centers of sabotage, bluster PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, are turning criminals into freedom fighters, training them, delivering weapons and arms to them and directing their sabotage from Pakistan. Those pulling the strings are in the United States, China, Pakistan and Egypt.

Theories about international conspiracies against the progress of socialism have a long tradition in the Moscow agitprop head office. The admission--even if indirect--that Soviet policy somewhere in the world is meeting bitter resistance is, on the other hand, new for the Soviet citizen.

Soviet documentaries on Afghanistan avoid mentioning their own troops, who are described at most once, cleaning their barracks or reading their mail. The heavy fighting around Kabul in mid-July, in which the Soviets also suffered losses, are passed over in silence in the Soviet press. Soviet observers always accompany only Afghan army units on a "bandit hunt."

According to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, the war reports are intended to refute the claim of Western "liars" that the Afghan army is crumbling and is on the side of the rebels, just like the majority of the population.

As proof to the contrary, courageous Afghan soldiers, as well as rural inhabitants, tested by suffering but full of hope (friendly to the government), are praised in the style of the Old Slavic heroic epics. In this way, the backdrop needed for bravery and tears reveals something of the hard everyday life of the occupying forces.

For the first time since the fighting with China in 1969 decorations are again being awarded in the Soviet army to bolster the morale of the troops. The eulogies for fallen Soviet officers, which had been suspended since last summer, were resumed again recently--a sign of increasing military difficulties.

Members of the civil defense and the paramilitary organization DOSAAF can read in their monthly magazine KNOWLEDGE OF WAR how comrades in the colonial service are carrying out their "responsible mission."

Their "international duty on the territory of the Afghanistan Democratic Republic" is restricted, according to the military paper, to freight transportation, road construction and educational journeys, during which the Afghans are enlightened about the building up of socialism and are entertained with Soviet folklore.

The Soviets still live in encampments outside the settled areas, "in the midst of deserts and stony gorges." They drill for their own water, generate their own electricity: food and necessary goods are brought in from the Soviet Union. "Conditions are hard," the correspondent from KNOWLEDGE OF WAR concedes, "everything here costs maximum exertion."

Communications rely almost exclusively on helicopters because of the constant threat of attacks, and even this is an "extremely difficult and dangerous way," since the resistance fighters are now shooting down helicopters.

The reporter betrays one secret of war: The limited contingent of the Soviet army in Afghanistan consists in large part of 18-year olds, who "were still in school a short time ago," the army is apparently being filled by recruits who have to go into the Afghan desert immediately after basic training.

There the inexperienced soldiers have to pass a hard test straight away: Even the peaceful cultural campaigns, the military correspondent complains, are "by no means without danger"--everywhere rebels lie in wait.

PRAVDA reported the "assassination" of an Afghan political general and his escort--a "villainous crime" right in the center of Kabul.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA reported: "Outwardly the enemy cannot be distinguished from a peasant," but "no sooner has the soldier turned round than he has a bullet in his back."

Moscow has never written so openly about dealing with guerillas: The Afghans feel revulsion at the "bestial brutality" of the rebels and had "now turned away from the terrorists."

The Soviets are forcing themselves to be calm: When they conquered Central Asia at the beginning of the 1920s, native resistance lasted for a decade--then the intruders had won. So, today, Soviet propaganda is utilizing familiar images of the enemy:

The dreaded "gang leaders" of Afghanistan appear either as dispossessed large-estate owners, who were stigmatized in the Soviet Union as "kulaks" and liquidated, or as "dushmans" and "bashmachs": These were the names given to the Moslem partisan groups in the Asian Soviet republics who vainly fought against communism.

Just like them, the "counterrevolution" is bound to fail: "The plans of the enemies of Afghanistan are doomed to failure," prophesies the NOVOYE VREMYA, the organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Perhaps the more realistic campaign is intended to prepare the Soviet citizen that the judgment cannot be carried out quite so soon.

The conservative SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA is less optimistic in its judgment about the guerilla war: "It is a bitter struggle," writes the correspondent, "a struggle for life and death."

Deep Gratitude

In order to polish up the self-image cultivated by propaganda of the peace-loving Soviet army, which is received as a friend and protector even in occupied countries, the Soviet news agency Tass is mailing out photographs from occupied Afghanistan.

There is little evidence of confrontations with Afghan resistance fighters, the motifs are rather emphatically civilian in nature: a rich display of goods in the poor country, scenes of fraternization between Soviet soldiers and natives.

The official caption: "All honest Afghans cherish feelings of deep gratitude to the Soviet soldiers who are temporarily stationed in this friendly country at the request of the government."

Apparently the propaganda officials in Moscow accept the fact that the recipients of their PR photographs might notice the discrepancy between the illusion of harmony and reports of Western news agencies about bitter rebel actions.

GOVERNMENT BUYS OUT COMMUNICATIONS FIRM

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English No 17, 7 Aug 81 pp 25-26

[Article by Louise Denver]

[Text]

ONE OF THE MOST advanced telecommunications industries in the Arab world has just been bought out by the Bahrain government. A memo of agreement was signed and the sale of purchase completed for the government of Bahrain to take over 60 per cent of Cable and Wireless in Bahrain.

The authorized capital of Bahrain Telecommunications, the name of the new company, is 80 million Bahraini dinars corresponding to the net book value of Cable and Wireless assets in Bahrain on July 1.

Although Bahrain Telecommunications (BTC) is now majority Bahrain-owned, operations will continue to be run by Cable and Wireless until the formalities of registration as a Bahraini shareholding company are completed and the deal is made official by Emiri decree.

John Munday, the chief executive of the Bahrain subsidiary of Cable and Wireless, Bahrain International Communications (BIC) said the new company is expected to become official within the next couple months — he anticipates by *Eid al Adha* in October. Until then he will continue to direct operations with an expected BD30 million local turnover this year before becoming responsible to the board of directors of Bahrain Telecommunications (BTC).

The new board is to be formed but the Minister of Transport and Communications for Bahrain, Ibrahim Humaidan, is being widely tipped to lead the new company. U.K.'s state-owned Cable and Wireless will keep 40 per cent of the shares and the Bahrain government and government nominees, such as pension funds and national institutions, will own the rest. The unusual feature of the preliminary negotiations is that the government has already underwritten BD6 million of the issued BD60 million shares and is offering them to the public. So the Bahrain people can have a 10 per cent equity stake in BTC themselves.

The move had been under discussion for some years "because it is always advisable that the government has an interest in her communications network," said BIC chief Munday. Minister of Transport and Communications Humaidan said, "Majority ownership of the national telecommunications network is important for security, social and political reasons."

The United Arab Emirates announced its intention of taking control of all local subsidiaries of both C&W and International Aeradio on September 1, 1976. Emirates Telecommunications Corp. (EMIRTEL) came into being in which C&W and International Aeradio together had a 40 per cent holding and the UAE 60 per cent. They took over the

standard earth station at Dubai and the one 120 miles away at Abu Dhabi. This was the forerunner of the Bahrain move — tried and tested on exactly the same basis as the new Bahrain company BTC is being set up.

The takeover brought forward from 1982 when the concession granted to C & W was due to expire is in line with the whole Gulf policy to become owners of all natural resources, which of course includes the all important communications industries. The move had been under discussion for some years and the decision to go ahead now is a measure of the smooth and amicable transition that was always anticipated.

The takeover coincided with the opening of the new BD20 million telephone house in Bahrain and the new record services building adjacent to it. The seven-story block, the tallest in Bahrain, was built to house the two companies — BIC, the subsidiary of Cable and Wireless, responsible for the international side of C & W, and Bahrain Telephones, which runs the local services. In anticipation of the government takeover the two companies merged last month so that the chief executive of BIC became responsible for four divisions — engineering, administration, finance and communications.

The new building was just one more milestone in Bahrain's Communication history and symbolic of the crucial role the industry plays in the island's economy. Tenders for the next major project under way are expected to be received by mid-September. Four firms have been invited to construct the \$60 million submarine cable linking Bahrain with Qatar and the UAE. Work on the joint venture between the three governments is expected to start by mid-1982 and the completion date is set for the end of 1983. The cable will offer 1400 voice channels and as a measure of its importance, chief executive Munday sees its logical extension south into the Indian Ocean and north to Kuwait.

Ultimately the submarine cable will be owned 40 per cent each by Bahrain and the UAE and 20 per cent by Qatar. The project consultant is a Swedish firm

SWEDTEL and the invitees for tender are Standard Telephones and Cables, the U.K. subsidiary of ITC; the French firm Submaroom; Nippon Electric; Fujitsu Ltd.; and the U.S. firm Western Electric International. The cable will keep pace with the tremendous growth rate in the demand for telephone and telex services in Bahrain, estimated at around 20 per cent annually, and should be sufficient to last the next 25 years' requirements.

From March 31, 1975 to January 31, 1980 the total telephones in Bahrain increased by a phenomenal 215 per cent to 72,564. And over the three years from 1977 to 1980 the number of international message minutes (overseas) increased from 10.0 million to 27.7 million.

In addition to the giant strides Bahrain has made in its domestic services with the introduction of digital exchanges shooting her communications industry into the forefront of the latest in technological development, the island provides direct international dialing to Europe, North America, Africa, Asia and other world points by the two earth stations in Bahrain via satellite. The short-haul traffic to the neighboring Gulf states currently provided by microwave and tropospheric scatter will soon be replaced by the submarine cable and the development of Arabsat.

The latter is a stationary satellite that will be suspended above the Arab world to bounce instant communications from all the subscribing countries' earth stations. The agreement was signed in early 1981 in Jordan to place the satellite in the air by 1983. The French firm Aerospatiale, partners with a U.S. firm, will be responsible for controlling the project. And the individual countries participating will be responsible for the construction of their own earth stations.

Bahrain is already way ahead of the rest of the Gulf in this field and its first station, which started up in 1969, paved the way for her present economic and commercial growth. The station was constructed at that time at a cost of BD 5.5 million to give Bahrain diversity of

routing and to meet the enormous demand for international communications services. The fully automatic telex services to most countries in the world is now used by 1460 subscribers and has capacity for 2500 machines, enough to cope with anticipated demand until 1985.

A spinoff to Bahrain's communication policy has been the setting up of a financial center that has attracted worldwide attention. National and international financial institutions found the readymade communications network a boon for the transmission of financial intelligence that keyed them in to the world wide money markets.

CSO: 4300/88

PCI ORGAN EXAMINES CAUSES OF BANI-SADR'S FALL

Neutralization of Supporters

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 26 Jun 81 pp 19, 20

[Article by Massimo Boffa: "The Fall of Bani-Sadr"]

[Text] The recent events in Iran are not ascribable so much to the manipulation of the Islamic masses as to the political neutralization of the ousted president's adherents. Bani Sadr had not one ally he could count on. Is this a repression without anything to stop it, or is it the beginning of a bloody civil war?

The curtain has risen once again on the drama of the Iranian revolution, and the scene this time portends an inauspicious future. Decisive events are still in the making, but the direction they are taking, while still inconclusive, is clear. What is not clear, however, is how this development will end up and when. Khomeyni has given the Islamic movement's extreme right a free hand to favor itself by disrupting the fragile equilibrium that has balanced the rapports between the powerful factions within the revolution. Until yesterday the idol of the Iranian masses but then abandoned to his fate by Khomeyni, Bani Sadr has fled into hiding; and while the extremists are trying to find him, they are arresting numbers of his collaborators. The roads are under surveillance by pasdaran and squads of hezbollahi. In their first sporadic attempts at armed resistance, the mojahedin and fedayin have been intimidated and driven back with bloodshed by firing squads and judiciary terror. The various forces of opposition, both religious and laic, appear to be disoriented and poorly prepared to fight the Islamic extremists.

In a dispatch from Tehran several months ago, RINASCITA warned its readers not to swallow oversimplified rumors about the Iranian revolution which were then circulating; we pointed out that its enemies were not confronting a well ordered totalitarian regime, with its law and rituals, but rather an extremely open political situation that must logically lead to civil war, motivated by an accumulation of resentments. Iranian society, in fact, had been polarizing more and more radically: on the one hand, the extremists' structures and practices in the government, in parliament, in the judiciary, in the mass media, and in parallel organisms created by the revolution; on the other hand, the "veto power" held by ex-president Bani Sadr, surrounded by a rising number of committed activists, particularly among the Shiite clergy, and various factions of the opposition in the battle to preserve a "pluralist" situation. Both sides claimed popular support and the strength of the armed forces.

Under these circumstances, the possibility of a catastrophic clash could not be deemed a remote eventuality; in fact, it was explicitly called for by the nation's political leaders if and when Khomeyni should disappear from the scene, since apparently his primary role had become that of guarantor of political equilibrium. Instead, the Imam decided to anticipate the moment for settling accounts. In the coming weeks we shall know whether he has provoked a civil war or avoided it through preventative repression. Without Khomeyni it would be fought in his name by both sides, and the outcome would be highly uncertain. But now that he has chosen to side with the Islamic revolution, Bani Sadr's party has been outlawed, and the clash can be contained, at least for the moment, through the initiative of God's party.

The determinant factor in the positions held by the opposing forces, Khomeyni's change of mind, introduced something totally new into the internal situation, and whoever undervalues it in the belief that the Imam has always been opposed to the president simply does not know the most elementary facts about the Iranian revolution. Indeed, it was Khomeyni who delegated to Bani Sadr the command of the armed forces although, according to the Constitution, he should have been in command himself. Furthermore, he was one of the most active contributors to the president's popularity. During the early months of the war, the Imam even endorsed Bani Sadr's program in defense of the specialists, subsequently mortified by the Islamic and populist "cultural revolution." At the time, many in Tehran were willing to bet on--or hope for--a more decisive distancing from the Islamic Republican Party.

Then matters moved ahead with precipitous speed. The national government found itself increasingly paralyzed by internal conflicts, which allowed [Khomeyni] little time to make a choice; and since he felt a closer affinity with the party of God's extremists, he chose it over the movement headed by Bani Sadr.

As happens after every defeat, the errors committed by the president are now under review--and not without a dose of malice. Undoubtedly Bani Sadr overestimated his strength and carried out various incautious measures. Not that he lacked a considerable following among the people--to the contrary. Paradoxically, his fall occurred not in a moment of weakness but rather when his actions were undermining his political adversaries. He was the only Iranian leader who had a real charismatic rapport with the masses. But his charisma rested not only on his personal resources: to a great extent, it reflected the legitimacy granted him by Khomeyni. Consequently, the enormous influence he exerted over the people abruptly vanished when the Imam turned against him, which happened as soon as Khomeyni realized that the president was leading an opposition, speaking more and more openly in behalf of the laic, nationalist, and leftist factions. Bani Sadr's power of attraction appeared irresistible until he began to penetrate the heart of the Khomeyni revolution. The legal system was no help to him; the Constitution, in fact, denied him the trappings of power it conceded instead to his adversaries. To be effective, therefore, his actions could only be illegal to some degree, a condition his enemies eagerly exploited.

At the crucial moment, Bani Sadr could not count on a single ally of any weight. Even the army, to which he had dedicated considerable care, hastened to declare its loyalty to Khomeyni and its "neutrality" in the political battle. Certainly, it would have been ingenuous to expect it to behave otherwise. The charismatic rapport between the Imam and the people, the one truly stable factor in the ongoing Iranian revolution,

has automatically stripped every institution acting against his authority of its power. This is true also of the army and its officers. In any event, as always the armed forces express their loyalty with prudent reserve. Their leaders have never been partisans of the Islamic republic. It has been, and continues to be, their policy to gain time, awaiting the most propitious moment to achieve an autonomous role. Today the armed forces are still not subjected to politics, nor have they been integrated in any way into the mechanism of consolidating the new power. They are deployed on the frontiers, not in the cities. Yet, it is clear that in the long run, their political role is destined to increase in proportion to the uncertainty of the outcome of the domestic strife.

Here we come to the core of the question: what will happen, what is happening in Iran? Are we observing a repression without anything to stop it or the beginning of a bloody civil war? For the present, the prospects seem to be in no way definitive, nor are they as unilaterally favorable as the victors' propaganda would like us to believe. Despite all appearances, the fall of Bani Sadr is a serious trauma for the Iranian revolution which cannot easily be cured. This time we must not allow ourselves to be duped by the television camera showing vast crowds jamming the streets of Tehran and calling for the president's head. They are not the same throng of millions who hitherto turned up for every momentous development in the revolution. The kindest estimates cite only a few tens of thousands of demonstrators. The main factor in the fall of Bani Sadr has not been so much a manipulation of the masses by the Islamic extremists as the political neutralization of his huge following. This new act of the drama is being played with a relative passivity of the masses.

For the present, the opposition headed by Bani Sadr appears to be disoriented, without a voice, uncertain of its own identity. Accustomed to express its views in terms of the revolution as a wing of Khomeyni's political array, today it is immobilized by the Imam's actions. It is not by chance that the first to make a counter move have been the extreme left groups, the "mojahedin" and "fedayin," long consigned to oblivion and fought by Islamic power. Nevertheless, the executions in the past several days betray the evident fear of a much stronger resistance. From some Iranian cities, chiefly Mashad, come reports of extremely violent uprisings, their outcome taken less for granted than in the capital. The country's opposition to the extremist policies of the Belai government is far more widespread than it seems to be on the surface. Thus, much can still depend on the fate of the opposition leaders, primarily Bani Sadr who, in all probability, has never moved beyond Tehran's city limits.

The Islamic Republican Party has sought to seize uncontested power in order to realize finally its social goal: to outlaw the other parties so that it can establish a one-party regime based on a sort of popular democracy; to introduce the Islamic model into the nation's juridical legislation; and to substitute the structures of social radicalism with a state apparatus. But now that all institutional power rests in its hands, never has the Islamic republic seemed as feeble, as exposed to attack from the growing numbers of its enemies.

Shapur Bakhtiar, formerly prime minister under the Shah and now living in exile in Paris, takes no pains to conceal his satisfaction with the party's weakness. And what about the West, what about Europe? It appears that millions of people feel deep sympathy for the unfortunate Bani Sadr. But who has stepped forward to help him?

He tried until the last to communicate with Europe, to explain to the nations of Europe the motives for his own revolution. But who listened to him? Who responded when, he appealed, in the name of those international laws of which the European nations declared themselves to be so proud, for denunciation of Iraq's aggression, which was left to him alone to resist? What did Europe do to counter that hostile, demoniacal image the Islamic extremists attributed to Bani Sadr's "illusions?" What did Europe do to show the Iranians that it was different from the Europe they had known, that it was worth the trouble to make the effort to establish a mutual relationship?

Islamic Jacobinism

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 20 Jun 81 p 20

[Article by Leonardo Paggi: "Islamic Intolerance"]

[Text] They cashiered Bani Sadr and shot down his closest political colleagues. In a climate still apparently marked by an intense mobilization of the masses, the new Iranian Islamic republic is slipping steadily and openly toward authoritarianism, thereby indicating that it is incapable of undertaking the costs and benefits of a political dialectic which everyone considered not only fully compatible with the new regulations adopted by the popular rebellion against the shah's dictatorship but also respectful of them. Whatever may be the complexity and specific nature (both beyond discussion) of Iranian reality and its improbable identification with Eurocentric categories, the new political turning poses basic questions again on how to decipher and read the contradictory forms that liberating processes everywhere seem to pose.

Once again we find ourselves facing a drastic inconsistency between a social content of emancipation, characterized by a popular revolt against the most brutal and immediately visible forms of imperialistic oppression and the entrenchment of a power which patently wants to seal off hermetically every ulterior avenue of expansion. This contradiction is nothing new to the Italian and European left. Perhaps for this reason it seems more than ever urgent to go beyond summary, elusive judgments and, particularly, to avoid stopping short once again at an overly passive acceptance of the diverse results between the "social" and "political," but to turn back and reflect on the structural limitations of a political model, the classical type of social revolution repeatedly hampered by obstacles; in other words, to review the model that prevailed between 1789 and 1917, subsequently from the Chinese revolution to the anticolonial movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

Certainly it is not a problem of latching on tardily to the assumptions characteristic of the whole liberal political tradition, which identify with democracy and its principles of a competitive ethos--the market society, which finds its fullest expression in the various "economic" theories of democracy. Instead, it is a matter of understanding more clearly that even intense mobilizations of the masses do not by themselves automatically guarantee that they will be granted a greater participation in the process of political decision making. The history of the Jacobin model and the wide range of forms it has taken bears ample witness to the opportunities within reach of popular uprisings to overthrow existing state and bureaucratic orders, paralyzing their capacity to respond and react (in this sense, the Iranian revolution has been surprising in its ability to propose a victorious outcome of

mass movements against the power of a highly modern and efficient war machine). At the same time, it shows its enormous power to encompass popular energy in the new state's legitimacy, but it hinders every facile equation between a developing representation and the growth and consolidation of political democracy.

The question is not without implications in the matter of recognizing theoretically and politically the development processes of democracy, inherent to a great extent in the socialist tradition of the Western workers' movement. The liquidation of Bani Sadr points out the Islamic party's intolerance of every limitation imposed on its own power that can come from expounding real interests, hence also from inevitably distorting them. Whatever the facts of Islam may be, even in its violent verbal rejection of the Soviet model, the Iranian victors seem to be more and more tempted to repeat the one-party experiment (difficult now to say with how much possibility of success), which has dominated an entire phase in the history of the national liberation movement. In other words, the experiment of an authoritarian or plebiscitarian democracy which, beginning with the classical postulate of "popular sovereignty" or "general will," ends up by giving a good example of the historical and political mechanisms which can turn a process of democratic development into a kind of "tyranny of the majority."

Today perhaps more than ever, the European socialist movement must continue to uphold the democratic participation of the masses, it must clarify its own independence (theoretical, not only political) from that primordial political model which, in its own infancy, manifested an explicit distrust in principle of every form of private and group social organizations. "The sovereign body, being constituted only by the individuals who comprise it, does not have, and cannot have, any interests contrary to their interests, therefore it has no need to give guarantees to its subjects because it is impossible that such a body would wish to harm all its members. The sovereign body, for the very fact that it is such, is always what it must be" (Rousseau).

At the same time, moreover, the Iranian experiment poses another question of primary importance: the forms its own development is taking--that is, given the integration levels of the world market and the very technological complexities of that development, whether the Jacobin formula can continue to be (as it has been all during its glorious past) the authoritarian political instrument that can guarantee a strong, secure direction in an accelerated process of modernization. The Shah's failed policy of integrating [Iran's economy] on a subordinate level with the great American multinationals is not in itself enough to hope for the eventual success of a political model inevitably induced to interpret the problems of national autonomy in terms of self sufficiency.

We must not forget that the crisis of nonalignment is also, to a large extent, the crisis of a hypothetical economic development based on relative national autonomy (example: the shipwreck of the Indian experiment). But the way self-criticism developed on the Maoist model or the evolution of the Soviet's single party toward a neocorporative kind of system, which entrusts main choices to negotiations between the centers of power--don't these factors demonstrate the indisputable justification for social complexity, even where we find the maximum expansion of Jacobinism?

We have listed some of the most disparate problems and questions for one reason only: to call attention to the fact that Iran's woes will contribute to the rising need to analyze more precisely and dispassionately those concepts and key words such as "reevaluation" and "democracy," which have played such a major role in the whole history of the European socialist movement.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF RELIGION, POLITICS ANALYZED

Shi'ism in Islamic Republic

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Aug 81 p 2

[Article by Mehdi Mozzafari, Iranian professor residing abroad]

[Text] The arrival of Mr Bani-Sadr and Mr Mas'ud Rajavi in France in exile has again called attention to the Iranian revolution which, like so many others, is devouring its children and even its fathers. Whereas Mr Rezvanian, in response to Daniel Ribant, stresses the legality of the election of the deposed president, Nuri Albala questions whether the people's Mojahedin is not making a fatal mistake by banking on Bani-Sadr and the conviction that Imam Khomeyni will lose all popular support. Mr Mozzafari hardly believes in the Islamic Republic's compliance with the principles of Shi'ism and P. Hartmann denounces the complicity which, according to him, exists between the Toudeh communist party and the leaders of the Islamic Republic.

Is the republican government Shi'ite? Was it Islamic? The answer obviously depends on what is meant by a republic. If we accept, along with J.-J. Rousseau, that "a republic is any state governed by laws; monarchy itself is a republic," the question is irrelevant. But if we want to attribute particular features to a republic and define it as a nonhereditary political system that is essentially based on the predominance of the will of the people, then the issue of its compliance with Koranic precepts may be raised.

In reality, Islam does not mean a great deal by itself. Of course, as everyone knows, there is a book, the Koran; a messenger, Mohammed; and a long, 14-century history. But what gives concrete shape to all of these components is clearly the way in which they are examined, interpreted and put into practice. Above all, that depends on the areligious and material interests in question.

The Koran makes no definitive reference to either government or the state. In this connection, it simply orders the faithful to obey God, his prophet and rulers (Sourate IV, verse 62/63), just as it requires them to resolve their problems through negotiation (principle of chura).

Apparently aware of the 'nonexistence of Koranic texts concerning this matter, the Iranian leaders have attempted to solve the problem by referring exclusively to the governments of Mohammed and Ali in the seventh century,* which Moslem historiography is generally inclined to submit as the most perfect, the most just and the most original that mankind has ever known.

From the standpoint of legality, the status of chief of the Medinan community, over which Mohammed presided, by no means derived from the will of the faithful and even less from that of non-Moslem Medinans but rather, like his gift of prophecy, from the will of God. Thus this is a fundamentally theocratic system which it would be pointless to try to compare to a republican government.

Ali's government is less removed from this idea, insofar as Ali was the only one of the four "well-guided" caliphs whose access to power derived neither from an appointment by his predecessor nor from a designated assembly nor from a limited assembly. He attained power following a riot which culminated with the assassination of the ruling caliph. Shi'ism has always stressed the spontaneous character of Ali's rise to power. However, it has always, and this is the most important point, refused to attribute Ali's legitimacy to a popular vote. Much to the contrary, the Shi'ite argument is that Ali was regularly appointed to his position by the prophet. And subsequent events, which really brought him to power, are far from constituting the legal basis for his appointment.

The type of theoretical contradiction with which Shi'ism is struggling is thus apparent. On one hand, Khomeyni has proclaimed a republic in the name of Shi'ism while, on the other, the models invoked have nothing to do with such a government.

By theoretically comparing the imamate with the caliphate, the Shi'ites have practically, much more than the Sunnites, abandoned the principle of a republic. Judge for yourself:

- 1) Shi'ism believes in the nominal and express appointment of Mohammed's successor by God. It rejects the popular vote process.
- 2) None of the 12 Shi'ite imams has been "elected" to the imamate. This status is bestowed by heritage.
- 3) In the Shi'ite literature, there is not the slightest positive reference to the republic (Djumhur-i). This word has been used in a pejorative sense every time, to denounce the opposite school: Sunnism.
- 4) The Shi'ite prince is appointed by divine grace (lotf ilahi) or, in other words, providence. The consent and vote of the people are consequently excluded as a basis of legitimacy.
- 5) The expression "Islamic Republic" in Iran dates back only to late 1978 and early 1979. Khomeyni apparently did not have a clear idea of a republican government. The idea probably became established as the shah's position deteriorated.

*Mr Mehdi Bazargan's statement in LE MONDE of 26 January 1979.

6) In Khomeyni's statements prior to his arrival in France in October 1978, there is no trace, at least no explicit trace, of the republican idea. Of course, Khomeyni sharply criticized and challenged the government of the shah. He certainly accused the Pahlavis of being usurpers, but not because they were kings, rather because they had seized power by violating the constitution, which was also monarchical.

7) It was only in his statement of 1 November 1978 that Khomeyni publicly referred to the republican alternative.

As already stated, Islam provides no exact information about the form of government. Shi'ism is no exception to this rule. It is Moslem historiographers, jurists and theologians who have attempted to give shape to their speculations and thus to submit, in the name of Islam, "Islamic" forms of government, whether monarchical or republican. They "have put together an account of historical events, aimed at accrediting the idea of a legitimate successor of the prophet while designating his responsibilities as such. This is the conviction which has taken root."*

The Islamic Republic was established in Iran not because of its compliance with Koranic or Shi'ite standards, but for a simpler reason. Republican government was the antithesis of a monarchical government personified by a king who was especially hated by the people. But since this government is actually republican only in name, the president of the republic--under the 1979 constitution--is generally considered to be merely the ceremonial head of government. Thus he cannot invoke the will of the people as the source of his legitimacy and investiture.

Ayatollah, Tudeh 'Hand in Glove'

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Aug 81 p 2

[Article by Patrick Hartmann]

[Text] The ayatollah and the commissar, or if you prefer, the Islamic Republican Party (PRI) and the Toudeh, the Iranian communist party, go hand in glove together. They go hand in glove insofar as censorship, harassment, imprisonment, torture and execution are concerned.

For the (pro-Soviet) Iranian communist party is also pursuing the opponents of the government. Discreetly, of course, remaining in the wings and thus attracting international public opinion little when it denounces acts of despotism.

Actually, the Toudeh acts as a spy, denouncing anyone who complains and pointing a gun at anything that moves. For the religious fundamentalists to be able to take better aim, the target is brought out into the open. The evidence of such a fine symbiotic relationship is not lacking:

Regularly from January to April, the communist daily MARDOM has reported in its columns every strike, every occupied plant and every social conflict, but not to support the strikers, rather to call for repressive measures.

*M. Arkoun, "l'Islam et la laïcité" [Islam and Secularity], Centre Thomas-More, p 11.

During the same period, the (banned) newspaper MOUDJAHED (organ of the Khalq Mojahedin, Moslem leftists opposed to the PRI and Imam Khomeyni) provided proof on several occasions that the repression being carried out against the Islamic left was facilitated by the "reports" which the Toudeh had submitted to authorities. The communists denied this up until the time that MARDOM began to wonder how the aforementioned "reports," including records, were falling into the hands of the Mojahedin.

We are also amazed that a Marxist-Leninist newspaper like MARDOM was tolerated by the authorities until June 1981. The repression against the non-Islamic and insufficiently Islamic press dates back to August 1979. Even the newspaper of the Islamic Fedayin (religious radicals closely associated with the Moslem Brothers) was banned in March 1981, 2 months before MARDOM.

There is no question that the government's anticommunist propaganda is false. It enables the PRI to keep its reputation and that of Imam Khomeyni untarnished in the eyes of the (profoundly anticommunist) Iranian people. In reality, for example, it does not prevent Toudeh militants from participating--discreetly, of course--in mosque assemblies in which problems concerning neighborhoods, food supplies, etc., are discussed.

The PRI actually needs the Toudeh (the oldest PC [communist party] in the Middle East, with branches extending into all Arab capitals), its network, its establishment and the discipline of its cadres. Only the Toudeh can enable the religious radicals to stamp out leftist groups such as the Khalq Fedayin and the Khalq Mojahedin, which today constitute the only organized and truly popular opposition to the Islamic dictatorship. Moreover, the Iranian leaders periodically need the Soviet Union. According to one source at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, 80 percent of Iranian trade was routed through Soviet republics during the economic blockade of Iran.

The Toudeh in turn needs this alliance with the religious radicals to be able, thanks to them, to eliminate everything connected with the left and regain its strength. The PC has emerged very weakened from the Pahlavi period and its fanatical allegiance to Moscow has caused it to lose a great deal of popularity.

In the same way that the PRI is sounding the death knell for true Shi'ite Moslems,* the Toudeh is settling its scores with authentic leftist militants while being careful not to strike itself. Assuming that the PRI should remain in power, the opposition will at least be left with a poor consolation: that of witnessing, sooner or later, the ayatollah devour the commissar or vice-versa.

*I will take this opportunity to point out the assassination, which went unnoticed, of Abdel Al-Reza Ebrahimi, the spiritual leader of the Shi'ite community of the Sheykhis, a marvelous "school" concerned only with spirituality and whose research aroused the enthusiasm of the orientalist philosopher Henri Corbin. Al-Reza Ebrahimi was killed in Kerman last year. His disciples have accused the authorities. The latter have refused to open an inquiry into this matter.

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CSO: 4619/28

BANI-SADR ACCUSED OF HYPOCRISY, 'MISDEEDS'

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 31 Jul 81 pp 1-4

[Text] On Tuesday, 28 July 1981, Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr, the deposed president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, arrived in France on board a military plane. The right to political asylum, which he had already been granted in advance since 20 June, when he went into hiding, was generously confirmed at the Evreux airport. The fact that this aircraft left Iranian airspace under completely illegal circumstances was apparently not considered a usual case of air piracy.

Upon his arrival, Bani-Sadr was flanked by a strange pair. On his right stood Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of the people's Mojahedin, an urban guerrilla group of Islamic Marxist sympathies, notorious for more than a decade for their acts of terrorism. During his presidency, Bani-Sadr strongly opposed this group, condemning to death several hundred adolescents who claimed to be associated with the Mojahedin. Since being deposed, the former president has made peace with his former enemies and Mr Rajavi (their supreme leader) has taken refuge at his side in France at the very time that his followers, who include 12- and 13-year-old adolescents, are being massacred in the Islamic Republic. On Bani-Sadr's left was Colonel Moezi, the shah's former and last pilot, still proudly wearing the blue silk scarf of Imperial Army officers about his neck on that Tuesday morning.

What a strange escape, a strange honeymoon, and a strange asylum which has been granted to Bani-Sadr.

Several tens of thousands of Iranians have taken refuge in France since the revolution. Ingratitude is not one of their characteristic traits. But they fear for their lives and for those of their children. For if the Bani-Sadr-Rajavi alliance does not manage to unify those refugees, it will pose a constant threat to them. The consequences of this incident are foreseeable:

- 1) From a diplomatic standpoint, the freedom and undoubtedly the lives of French nationals in Iran are seriously threatened. If it is true that the mullahs control the crowds which they are manipulating, it has also been demonstrated that at the right time, they know how to throw them into a state of collective hysteria.
- 2) In France, the safety of Iranian nationals is seriously jeopardized. For example, there has been an assassination attempt against Shahpur Bakhtiar, which caused the death of a French policeman; the assassination of Prince Shafik at Villa-Dupont; the

regular attacks carried out on public thoroughfares against anti-Khomeyni demonstrators, and the recent criminal abduction of Colonel Zolfaghari at the university residence halls in Paris provide us with proof, if there is any need for it, of the methods used by the friends of Khomeyni and Bani-Sadr, at odds today but who were long allies. The appearance of two kinds of terrorism on French soil can now be feared: a) acts of retribution between Khomeyni supporters and Mojahedin, who are now in armed conflict, and b) assassination attempts against any Iranian national opposed to either of these groups. Everyone is threatened: monarchists, republicans, nationalists, even moderate and those following a wait-and-see policy, who do not dare take a stand.

The Free Iran Movement solemnly cautions French authorities against the consequences of the asylum granted to Bani-Sadr and the hospitality provided for the terrorist Rajavi. Mr Bani-Sadr and Mr Rajavi are not just political refugees. They have too much innocent blood on their hands to now be considered victims. There are distinctions required by the most basic morals. Nothing would be more ridiculous than to systematically applaud the positions taken by all of Khomeyni's enemies without considering their responsibilities or their pasts. Bani-Sadr is the very one who, in response to the Americans' refusal to extradite the shah, did not hesitate to coordinate an international kidnapping operation.

In 1978, President Giscard d'Estaing granted Khomeyni permission to reside at Neauphle-le-Chateau, enabling him to orchestrate his propaganda of hatred from France. But the president had an excuse: at the time, no one was really familiar with the false imam's doctrine and no one in the West could anticipate his crimes. But President Mitterand's position is very different in 1981. He cannot ignore the abominable crimes perpetrated in Iran while Bani-Sadr was president of the Revolutionary Council and later president of the republic, heinous crimes which he allowed to take place. Everyone can understand France permitting him to escape the gallows, but no one will condone France allowing him to pursue a plan of action which formerly led to so many acts of torture, assassination and abuse of human dignity and rights.

Too much has been said and written. The political thoughts of Bani-Sadr and Rajavi have been written down; their misdeeds to date are numerous enough to permit an appraisal of their future actions.

History could not forgive such a mistake.

Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr is well known to the world: every fact and action in his life during the last 3 years have been reported by all international publications.

But an appraisal of him is needed. This man, although he resided in France for 15 years, speaks French very poorly. That is why he has always made very vague statements to the mass media in that language, gladly willing to be considered a just man by his Western listeners. He has an especially large audience, since no one would assume, just by looking at him, that he is insincere. The myth of a liberal, socialistic and leftist Bani-Sadr has thus emerged. His best friends, so-called progressive Westerners, think that they have heard the echo of their own thoughts in his remarks, thus considering him to be one of them. Some of them have even gone so far as to write doctrinal works in his name.

But for us Iranians who have heard him speak and who have read his countless papers and reports (for his verbosity is unparalleled), it is clear that Bani-Sadr is neither a liberal nor a leftist. In reality, he is only an ambitious opportunist who is determined to succeed by any means.

At the very time that France was asking him not to make political statements, Bani-Sadr granted the London TIMES an interview in which he condemned, without any qualms, the man whose hand he had openly and publicly kissed on the day that he became president. He also said that Khomeyni alone was responsible for the atrocities committed in Iran.

He who has betrayed, will betray. If given the opportunity, Bani-Sadr will treat France the same way that he has treated Khomeyni. He also did not hesitate, when he was all-powerful, to violently attack France, that place of refuge which had accepted him for so many years.

But let us review his duties within the Islamic Republic:

According to his own statements, he was the theoretician of Islamic subversion. As early as February 1979, he became one of the members of the Revolutionary Council, endorsing the assassinations, disguised as political executions, of the old regime's representatives--the very ones who had simultaneously granted him four scholarships, which he used to reside in France for 15 years.

After becoming president of the Revolutionary Council, he was directly responsible for the thousands of other assassinations ordered following so-called Islamic "trials," which were only masquerades that arbitrarily sentenced to death anyone who did not conform to the Islamic Republic. It was for this same purpose that he ordered the organization of bloody expeditions against the provinces that revolted: Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, Gorgan and Fars.

As a member of the High Economic Council, it was he who, after becoming "father of the Islamic economy," established the bases for a ridiculous, destructive system. That is true to such an extent that Iran today has nearly 5 million jobless (who do not receive any compensation) and the country has been plunged into an unprecedented depression, making it unable to satisfy its most basic needs.

As minister of economy and finance, it was he who dismantled Iran's banking system.

Briefly minister of foreign affairs and interim director of seven other ministries, he got rid of all of the government's valuable people, on the pretext of a purge, replacing them with people whose incompetence and negligence were notorious.

Bani-Sadr was also the one who advised women to adopt Islamic dress, enjoining them to cover their hair, since the light shining off it could disturb men at their work.

During the last 2 and $\frac{1}{2}$ years, we have not found any social class in Iran that has been shielded from the "Bani-Sadr effect." We should also recall that he was the one who appointed the bloodthirsty Khalkhali in April 1980, who was responsible for the "fight against drugs." All during this period, in which he was triumphant, Bani-Sadr never stopped writing. All of his works and statements enable us to define

the man: he is a demagogue and an ambitious opportunist who has never failed to flow with the tide. Let us recall the following few facts:

In April 1980, Iranian leftist militants were demonstrating on the campus of the University of Tehran. The Mojahedin among them had already expressed their opposition to the Khomeyni regime.

On 21 April, Bank-Sadr, then president of the Revolutionary Council, ordered them to disperse within 3 days under penalty of the worst sanctions (Iranian press, 22 April 1980).

On the following day at 0730, he repeated that order. Then serious confrontations during the day set the leftist opponents and Moslem reactionaries against each other. Hezbollahis (religious fanatics) armed with clubs were dispatched to the site, wounding and killing those who were not their own. That same evening, addressing those gloomy henchmen, Bani-Sadr thanked them for the job done as follows: "Good Moslem people! The determination which you have shown during these few days has made it possible to rescue the country from a very grave danger. Now that the Islamic Government has been established, all of you must know that the essential condition for the survival of the revolution and the safety of the country is your obedience." (Iranian press: 22 and 23 April 1980).

One month earlier on 19 May 1980, Bani-Sadr had ordered the Mojahedin to put down their arms, proclaiming publicly: "We will certainly never negotiate with you. That would amount to recognizing your power, when you have risen up against the will of the people. A government chosen by the people cannot allow itself to surrender to bandits like you" The leader of the same Mojahedin was none other than Mas'ud Rajavi, at whose side Bani-Sadr recently arrived in France. Hypocrisy cannot be carried any further.

To complete this sketch of the man, a final quotation should be enough to make it clear: On 26 April 1980, during a radio-television interview in Iran, Bani-Sadr said: "From the time that we decided to accept the authority of a guide, we must obey him, even if we do not believe in him. That is what we call the cultural revolution." (Keyhan, 26 April 1980)

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CSO: 4619/27

FRANCE ATTACKED FOR GRANTING ASYLUM TO DISSIDENTS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 5 Aug 81 p 1

[Text]

ONCE AGAIN, the anti-human origin of the U.S. mercenaries has come to full manifestation, once again the treacherous advocates of imperialism and their belligerent affiliates, such as the Administrative Officials of the French Government, revealed their opportunistic tendencies to the impoverished masses all over the world. France, the so-called Land of Liberty, takes pride in its theoretical, superficial support for non-provocative political activities. However, the antagonistic policies adopted by the vicious authorities, disguised in deceptive propaganda, has been divulged to the oppressed nations throughout the world. All the Moslems still recall the brutal crimes, committed by expansionist France in Algeria. The Islamic nations also remember that, after numerous cruel crimes, the exploitative government of France left Lebanon quite defenseless to fall victim to the assaillancy of the Occupying regime of Qods, inspired by the notorious terrorist, Menachem Begin. Moreover, in the guise of supporting the Lebanese nation, the French government has assumed a nonchalant policy in confrontation with the extensive massacres of Zionist elements.

Far from preserving loyalty to her commitments, the French government further sustained the Zionist regime of Israel by sending its Mirage Fighters, whereby, thousands of innocent Lebanese were brutally massacred in success-

ive air raids inflicted upon South Lebanon. Such is the phoney definition of the humanitarian support for Lebanon, within the cultural context of the assailant Colonizers. Upon the arrival in France of the ousted president Banisadr, along with the notorious terrorist Masud Rajavi, the Moslem Iranian students in France staged a peaceful demonstration in opposition to the criminal policy of France in granting political asylum to Banisadr.

Although the so-called democratic regime of France made efforts to prevent the demonstrations of the Iranian Moslems in Paris, the authoritative agents of the Great Satan enticed the fugitive counter-revolutionaries, the disenchanted SAVAK agents and the political splinter groups to launch severe attacks upon the Islamic Students' Council in Paris. During the hostile attacks at the Islamic Council, the Fascist Police Force of France also sustained the counter-revolutionaries. Subsequently, the assailants inflicted extensive damage and severe injuries upon the Moslem demonstrators.

In pursuit of its interests, the imperialist U.S. has imposed the Zionist supporters of Bakhtiari and Banisadr upon the independent French nation. Thus, we hereby express our profound sorrow on account of such a calamity, since the opportunistic elements of the U.S. dictate their explo-

sive policies to the conscientious French people. We fervently hope that the French nation will not permit the Mitterrand Administration to abuse the revolutionary potential of the emancipated Iranian nation. Still, we are aware of the fact that the French people are subject to the anti-philanthropic policies of their administrative officials. Likewise the American nation shares the same catastrophic plight with the French people. Furthermore, the government authorities of France and the U.S. are also influenced by the Zionist, Imperialist Colonizers.

We severely denounce this assaillancy against the Islamic Students' Council in Paris. In the meantime we warn the French government of the disastrous consequences of such an antagonistic attitude towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic Government of Iran urgently demands severe penalty for the saboteurs involved in the attacks launched on the Iranian Moslem demonstrators against Banisadr. We officially ask for the restoration of the fugitive traitors, Banisadr and Rajavi, who are conspiring dastardly conspiracies in France in collaboration with the Zionist imperialist agents in order to destroy the Islamic Revolution. We fervently beseech God Almighty to emancipate all the impoverished peoples, suppressed by the belligerent Superpo-

wers. We are looking forward to the day, when Divine Justice will be further consolidated throughout the world.

We are looking forward to the inevitable political doom of the Occupying regime of Qods and her allies, along with the expansionist U.S.

Hail to all the noble revolutionary militants in South Lebanon, Fritrea, South Africa, and Northern Ireland who have made sacrificial contributions to the ultimate emancipation of all the exploited suppressed peoples of the world.

CSO: 4600/136

PALESTINIAN STATE SEEN AS INEVITABLE

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 29 Jul 81 p 10

[Article by Ya'acov Friedler]

[Text] IN 1897, at the conclusion of the first Zionist Congress, Theodor Herzl wrote in his diary that in Basle he had laid the foundations of a Jewish state.

His contemporaries would no doubt have expressed their disbelief if he had made his thoughts public. But after 51 years, he was proved to be right.

On July 17, 1981, with the Air Force raid on Beirut, Prime Minister Menachem Begin started the count-down for a Palestinian state. It will, I venture to estimate, take less than 51 months for history to confirm this.

Mr. Begin, unlike Dr. Herzl, was not aiming for a new state. He probably intended quite the opposite, but history will show that *nolens volens* — to use one of those Latin expressions our premier favours — he put the finishing touches to Palestine with that unfortunate raid. History does not measure intentions, it merely records events as they happen.

In fact, history has been moving towards a Palestinian state, and a sizeable school of thought in its favour has been building up in Israel as well. All of us who do not want to impose our rule on a million unwilling Arabs have indeed been seeking the best way of letting them manage their own affairs for the sake of both peoples.

THE RAID on Beirut turned world opinion overwhelmingly in favour

of a Palestinian state, giving explosive momentum to a process that had long since taken root — if only because the world hopes in this way to remove the Palestinian problem from the oil routes once and for all.

It is ironic that Begin of all people should have been the person to put the state on its feet with the ill-considered raid.

The cease-fire that has now brought the fighting on our northern border to a stop resulted partly from that raid, and no amount of verbal athletics can hide the fact that the agreement was made with the "so-called" PLO. We did not agree on a cease-fire with "the lawful government of Lebanon," as the Israel Government would have us believe, because the lawful government of Lebanon exercises no law in the area.

Every schoolboy knows that if you persuade a gang of hooligans to stop pelting you with stones from the backyard of a dear old lady's cottage, it is not the dear old lady who puts down the stones.

But unlike Begin, not every Israeli — and possibly not even a majority of Israelis — will regret the establishment of a Palestinian state. Some of us, indeed, have long believed that the sooner we reach agreement, on a state with the Palestinians, the less dangerous that state will be for our own future.

I WAS AMONG those who voted for Begin in 1977 precisely because

I believed that he would hand over some parts of Judea, Samaria and Gaza to the Palestinians — or for the Palestinians — with dignity, honour and possibly magnanimity. I believed the Alignment then was incapable of displaying such qualities.

As it transpired, Begin did display all these graces in handing over Sinai to the Egyptians. I am still sad that he did not do the same on our eastern side, too.

There may still be time left to hand over the eastern territory in a way which ensures that the new Palestinian state will not be a threat to Israel, or to the many Israelis who will live on its border. To promote fears of what such a state would do to the citizens of the coastal plain sounds somewhat hollow after what those in the Galilee have just undergone at the hands of the PLO, which Begin had publicly promised before his election would not occur.

No doubt, the Palestinians will take their Katyushas and 130 mm guns into their new state, but they will then be putting their own country on the line if they pull the trigger; they will be responsible for the safety of their own people; they will not be able to simply disregard the lives of the poor Lebanese.

If they fire on Israel, the world will not be "aghast" if Israel then silences their guns.

THE JORDANIANS stopped the PLO and the Syrians have not allowed them to shoot from Syrian

territory, precisely because the price is too high.

Moreover, the PLO will find that the Palestinians they come to "liberate" in Judea and Samaria will not allow them to provoke Israel into retaliatory action against them. They will in any case be so preoccupied simply keeping their state viable that they will have little spare time for shooting at Israel, even if the security arrangements we make in return for giving up the territory make effective shooting possible.

Nor should we forget that if the PLO thinks it is getting a bargain in Judea and Samaria, it is in for a surprise. And if it imagines that all the bleeding hearts of Europe, who so vigorously extol the rights of the

Palestinians to a state of their own, will care two hoots once they have it, it's wrong.

One can envision even the Arab states, who are now such zealous backers of Palestinian statehood, washing their hands of the whole business once the state is established and letting the Palestinians stew in their own juice.

The PLO may also find that the oil which lubricates its cause so well now will wear off as the interest of the oil sheikhs wanes, and Europe's moralists will find a more convenient cause to bleed for.

THE PLO may just find, one suspects, that the only reliable party it will be able to look to will be its Israeli neighbours. We, at least,

have had some success in turning this barren land into something better than a desert. In time, the PLO might even find that it can benefit from our experience.

Not a few Israelis object to the Beirut raid on purely moral grounds. Not a few may also acquiesce in a Palestinian state on moral grounds, believing that, like it or not, we must make room for them.

Would it be too much to hope that Begin, after he has taken so decisive a step towards Palestinian statehood, will still display grace and magnanimity in the face of the inevitable?

It would be nice to think he will do so, because that is the Jewish and the humane way to act.

COUNCIL IN GALILLEE ARAB VILLAGE DISSOLVED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 12-18 Jul 81 p 4

[Article by Daoud Kuttab]

[Text]

The Israeli Ministry of Interior dissolved the local council at Mughar village in the Galilee, June 25, one day prior to the scheduled High Court hearings regarding confiscated Mughar land. No official reason has been given.

The dissolution marks another turning point in the progressive council's battle with the authorities since their election in 1978. In the past three years the Rakah-led municipality has had its budget slashed, hundreds of dunams of land confiscated, and a series of problems with grants from government ministries.

In the last elections, Mughar, a village with a majority of Arab Druze, voted in a Rakah head of council and a majority for the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality list. Since that time this Galilee village of 16,000 has been plagued with a cash flow problem.

"We teachers of the village have suffered the most," said Salman Dagesh, a teacher at the local secondary school. Our salaries have been delayed almost every month since the council elections."

Other services and projects have also been affected. Amin Asakie, the head of the municipal council, explained to *Al-Fajr*, "Debts had been piling up against the council since 1973. When we took over, we discovered that many projects had been started and we had to foot the bill. But we haven't been able to get our regular annual budgets from the government." In 1980 the local council submitted an IS 10 million budget; only IS 3.8 million was approved.

The budgets for housing and education were delayed by administrative "red tape." Teachers and municipal employees got advances on their salaries until the government checks arrived.

When a Mughar resident, working in the housing ministry, inquired about the delays, he was told: "It is because the Mughar council considers the village Arab."

Mughar: An Arab Village

The change of council brought a change in official attitude to political/communal questions. When the present

council took over, they discovered that the former council had taken a decision declaring Mughar, a village with 52 percent Arab Druze population, a "Druze" village. "This was part of the attempt by the Israelis to brainwash the Druze into thinking that Druze is not only a religion but a nationality," said one municipal employee. "The first act of the new council was to unanimously reverse the previous decision, declare Mughar an Arab village and announce official opposition to mandatory conscription of Druze young people. In explaining its principled stand the council declared the Druze are an inseparable part of the Palestinian Arab people. "The Israeli government considers Mughar as a breeding ground for Zionism," Amin Askale states. "We consider it a farm for resistance. When we won, they hit the roof."

Councillors point out that "Druze" villages receive slightly better treatment from the Israeli authorities. "The Mughar council opted for integrity," said one.

Land Confiscation

Things came to a head in Mughar over the issue of land

confiscation. When a 620 dunam plot of land was slated for confiscation under the Judaization of the Galilee plan, the council decided to fight. The strip of land known as Dabet el Za'ter has been registered in the name of the village since Ottoman times. In the past most of such "common" land has been re-registered by the Israelis as "state land." After six inconclusive sessions with the state of Israel land committee, the council decided to circumvent the problem by giving the land to individual villagers. Within days the council gave plots in the strip to people wishing to build homes. Sixty building maps were approved altogether. The area was thus re-registered in the names of individuals.

Force

On the eve of the April Histadrut elections the road leading to Mamle and Musha, where 3,000 dunams of village is situated, was closed off. After complaints from farmers, Amin Asakle took the local council's bulldozer and re-opened the road. "The authorities thought we would go to court to fight it out," Asakle said. "We force them to take us to court if they want to take our land."

Locals noted that the Israelis often use the time it takes for cases to come to court to finish their land grabs. At the time of its dissolution, the council was also fighting another 700 dunam grab attempt through the courts.

Special Committee

The Israelis hit back by appointing an investigative committee to look into the affairs of the elected council.

The Interior Minister authorized the committee to examine the grievances of residents complaining of "inefficiency of the council and lack of needed services." The committee was appointed by Israel Koenig, District Commissioner of the Northern District. It consisted of Heads of Local Councils at Daboriah and Abu Sran (both sponsored by the NRP) and an employee of the Interior Ministry and the Head of the Land Ownership Office (*tabu*). The four came to the village and discussed the problems with residents, bank managers and clan heads. The contents of their report, which was delivered to the Minister of Interior, have not been made public. Lawyers for the council are at present appealing to the courts for a copy. As a result of this recent report the council was dissolved by order of the Minister on June 25.

Mixed Reaction

Some villagers raised legitimate questions with *Al-Fajr* on the running of the council. "The council has made many promises which it did not carry out," said Yousef Dagesh. "The council showed that it could not manage well. For example, excavation for the sewers was done twice and the council had to pay IS 400,000 in compensation to an engineer." Dagesh also questioned why personal checks were used to pay teachers.

Asakle Responds

Asakle defended the council's actions and explained some of the council's misunderstandings. "First of all," he said, "the sewers were only dug once. Secondly, work was properly advertised," he went on, "and

the tender accepted. It doesn't cost the council anything extra. The problem was a throwback to the time of the last council, when an engineer was commissioned to draw up maps for the school," said Asakle. "Then the Education and Housing Ministries insisted on following set maps. The engineer sued and won, and we had to pay for the previous council's mistakes."

Teachers are paid by personal check, the council accountant explained, because, "We were overdrawn in the bank. The government transfers the teachers' pay directly to our account in the local bank. Since we were overdrawn we would not be able to draw checks on the account for the teachers' pay. We decided to open a separate account for teachers' salaries. All this was done with the knowledge of all concerned parties."

List of Services

To combat the dissolution the council issued a leaflet detailing the services they provided during their tenure. Among other things the list included: a diesel roller which has paved 18,000 cubic meters of road, a building for mother and child care, new furniture for all the schools, a 12 dunam strip purchased for a future school, as well as the protection of land from expropriation. Local social workers and council employees are afraid that these services will be curtailed under the new regime.

Asakle told *Al-Fajr* that the council is particularly proud of its record on water supply. "In the two years and seven months (of the council) no house was without water, an everyday occurrence

in the past," he said. Asakle predicted that within months water would be cut off by the appointed committee.

Residents had mixed feelings about events of the past week. Some told *Al-Fajr* that they hoped that the committee would solve the financial problems of the village. All look forward to new elections. The date of the coming council elections is, as yet, unknown. "It depends on the Interior Minister and the mood of the village," said one resident. "If it looks like the Rakah supported Front can be defeated we will have elections. If not, no one knows."

Appointed Heads Declare Ignorance

In the place of the dissolved council a committee was appointed to carry out the work of the council. The committee is headed by Jamil Jadoon, retired head of the Immigration and Naturalization offices in Nazareth, and includes Judge Abdel Halem Thakho and Fouad Zu'be, an education inspector.

In his first day at the council Jamil Jadoon told *Al-Fajr*, "I have no experience in local councils but I will be given guidance by the Judge." When asked if he knew of the problems of the village he responded, "I am ignorant of the problems here but I will learn them." Jadoon said that he knows

nothing about the results of the investigation. He does know that his appointment came according to Law 38/3 of the Local Council Orders. Jadoon has no specific plans for the village but he vowed that he would not stay on if he did not get financial backing by the government.

Regarding the future, Ahmad Asakle, a former councilor, said, "Winning the council is only a means to an end. We are concerned in raising the awareness of the residents." Amin Asakle added, "I will continue to work through the Druze Initiative Committee to make our people aware. These decisions will not affect our enthusiasm. On the contrary, we will work harder now."

CSO: 4300/83

COMMENTARY ON U.S. AS TARGET FOR SAUDI OFFENSIVE IN PEACE PLAN

TA101108 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 Aug 81 p 5

[Commentary by Hagay Eshed: "The Saudis Assault the U.S. Target"]

[Text] The Saudis have learned from the Egyptians to assault the U.S. target--both the administration and public opinion--in an effort to weaken Israel's standing and gain more support for the Arabs' demands. Fahd is both imitating al-Sadat and competing with him. One would even conceivably trace a certain division of labor between President al-Sadat and Amir Fahd in trying to win over the heart of the United States. This conquest is both personal and political, set up one against the other: two Arab peace seekers versus the Israeli wormonger (as evidenced by the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the PLO command headquarters in the heart of Beirut).

Al-Sadat's and Fahd's common goal is to obtain U.S. support for the Palestinians' demands of Israel. The one favors these demands in terms of the representation (the PLO); the other backs their actual demands (total Israeli withdrawal, the establishment of a Palestinian state and the declaration of partitioned Jerusalem as its capital). The method they employ is to try to win by points, not with a knockout; to continue to erode Israel's status slowly, systematically.

Al-Sadat can afford to support the idea of incorporating the PLO into the peace process. He is already known to be a man of peaceful aspirations and one not suspect of supporting terrorism or extending aid to the Soviets in their maneuvers toward affecting Syrian military expansionism in Lebanon. Al-Sadat's moderation needs no proof.

Amir Fahd, on the other hand, is a newcomer to the peace game. He still cannot grant the PLO citations of honesty or capability, and any Saudi attempt to purge the PLO would besmirch Saudi Arabia rather than achieve its purpose. This is the objective division of labor between President al-Sadat and Amir Fahd, even if the details of the scheme have not been scrupulously coordinated. This is the method and this is the goal: to present peace plans that would appear to be more moderate than earlier ones; to drag Israel into issuing hasty negative reactions that would present it in a more extremist and belligerent light than ever before and would force it later to withdraw from its earlier positions

so as not to lose more points in the battle for the support of the U.S. administration and public. Al-Sadat's and Fahd's moves are well calculated and planned; the reactions in Israel--by both the government and the opposition spokesmen--hasty, surprised, not well thought out.

Neither the government nor the opposition can avoid reacting to the Saudi move. Both have different roles to play and each should fulfill it properly and be able to "hold back the fire" of political and propaganda reactions, and shoot only "directed fire." But the traditional division of roles between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East has been reversed, and now they are firing in an organized and well-calculated fashion in accordance with a predetermined plan, whereas here everyone grabs a gun and shoots in the air to boost his spirits and hear the sound of his own gun, smell the smoke and see the fire. In the distant past we used to deride the Arabs for doing what they did.

Prime Minister Menahem Begin will soon go to the United States. He will be asked to present to the U.S. administration a policy of peace and the resumption of the political process in the Middle East. Such a process will have to include Saudi Arabia and Jordan as well, so that the United States can continue to avoid incorporating the PLO into that process until it changes its positions and is prepared to recognize Israel. President Reagan is interested in incorporating the Saudis in the peace process in order to erect a basic anti-Soviet edifice in the Middle East and to be able to supply Saudi Arabia with all the sophisticated arms they are interested in without congress (and Israel) interfering in this. President Reagan will expect Menahem Begin to present him with an Israeli peace plan that would allow him to satisfy this prime U.S. interest in the Middle East, not a peace plan that would hamper it (even if it is equipped with the best of legal and moral reasons). Begin's visit to Washington will be tested primarily for whether it jeopardizes President Reagan's Saudi policy or helps it, even at the cost of a reasonable price to be paid to Israel for it. Will Begin demand a price or set up an obstacle? This is the crucial question Amir Fahd's peace plan presents to Israel.

During the election campaign, Menahem Begin derided the "Jordanian option" and the "Saudi option" raised by Shim'on Peres. One should hope that he only did so for election reasons and not because he did not fathom the real political content of these foreign terms. What they mean, in practical terms, is an Israeli plan that would allow the United States to bring the Saudis and the Jordanians closer to it and to guarantee their stability and reliance on the United States, as well as to permit it to continue to object to the incorporation of the PLO and the Soviets into the next stage of the peace process without torpedoing this process from its foundations. It means that this should be made possible, not sabotaged. If Menahem Begin now decides to cease being the prime minister of "Herut" and begins functioning as prime minister of Israel, he ought to invite Labor Party chairman Shim'on Peres and consult him on the "Saudi option" and the "Jordanian option" that could, perhaps, be submitted by Israel in Washington.

The opposition, for its part, should also begin functioning like an opposition following the election campaign and after a government enjoying parliamentary confidence has been set up in Israel. This is a fact and there are conclusions to be drawn from this reality. It is not the opposition's job to

try to foil Menahem Begin's imminent visit to Washington, or supply him and his supporters with pretexts and excuses for claiming that the opposition made him fail. If he does fail, this unfortunately will be the failure of the entire State of Israel and we will all share the brunt of the outcome; so that if he fails, let him fail on his own accord only, and let it be clear that he failed because of his policy or lack thereof, despite the good will of the opposition and its readiness to help him succeed. In order for the Labor Party (and, indeed, the entire alignment) to function as an opposition, it must complete its internal organizing and put an end to the domestic strife within its ranks over the composition of the Knesset defense and foreign affairs committee and the other supreme state bodies.

Why should we deny it: this domestic elections campaign is one of the causes of the raging competition of "shooting from the hip" by various opposition spokesmen. Both the government and the opposition should organize quickly to carry out their civic duties, which are so different in nature. Menahem Begin should do his homework before his fateful visit to Washington, and the opposition should be prepared to help him do it if he wants and is able to operate as a prime minister and not as the leader of the opposition who happens to be in the rule.

CSO: 4323/40

RABIN DEMANDS CHANGES IN LABOR PARTY

TA071256 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 7 Aug 81 pp 1, 7

[Report by Shlomo Naqdimon]

[Text] In talks he held last week, MK Yitzhaq Rabin has raised the demand for internal "democratization" in the Labor Party. He thinks that the Labor Party is not functioning properly and that there is need to execute immediate moves in it to change this situation.

Among other things, Rabin raised the following demands:

--that the Alef [citizens for Peres] circle be abolished.

--that the plan (recently in the works) to forthwith set up an election headquarters headed by MK Mordekhay Gur, to prepare for the next Knesset election be frozen.

--Rabin explained that the two above-mentioned institutions existed in the party a long time before the last Knesset election and said he believed they "neutralized" the party's work.

Rabin further demanded that:

--new party institutions be elected immediately. These are: an executive; an executive secretariat; an economic committee; a political committee; a legal committee and their respective secretariats. Rabin demands proper representation of all party factions in these institutions.

--the party's functioning be improved by establishing procedures and working regulations, and by holding executive meetings at set dates.

--deliberations on the next Knesset elections be held and that lessons be learned toward future public campaigns.

In his talks, Rabin has been explaining that the party is now crying out for an overhaul and real rehabilitation. He repeatedly argues that the internal elections held toward the party conference in 1980 were mishandled and that to a certain extent things had been distorted then. In his opinion, the necessary remodeling will also lead to changes in the wrongs in this sphere.

Rabin has hardly referred to party chairman Shim'on Peres in these talks. He has primarily spoken about content, but indirectly one can hear an overtone of criticism of the party chairman. The estimate in the Labor Party is that a possibility of a renewed Peres-Rabin feud is not to be ruled out. When asked whether the demands he had raised point to the revival of the option of a contest, Rabin replied: "There is no talk about a personal struggle, rather of a change in the party's everyday affairs."

Last week a closed meeting was held between the leaders of the various kibbutz movements in the Labor Party and the heads of the Rabin camp. The leaders of the kibbutz movements suggested not holding elections for the post of party secretary and to enable Hayim Bar-Lev to continue holding the job.

Rabin and his colleagues rejected the proposal outright, describing it as anti-democratic. They insisted that elections for the post of party secretary be held, as promised. Rabin again said that his camp is guided by the first-order principle that there is a right to compete for every post.

Yesterday Labor Party chairman Shim'on Peres held intensive--but separate--talks with MK's Eliyahu Speiser, 'Uzi Bar'am and Moshe Harif, and discussed the situation in the party and the prospects of a contest for the post of party secretary in September. It should be noted that Hayim Bar-Lev has said that if the party does not unite in backing his candidacy, he will not present himself as such.

Speiser and Bar'am announced already several months ago that they intend to compete for the post, whereas Peres has a written statement to Speiser saying he would support his candidacy.

CSO: 4323/40

BRIEFS

ECONOMIC POLL--Unlike their personal economic conditions, the economic condition of the State of Israel seems grim to the majority of the public. This emerges from a nationwide public opinion poll of the Pori Institute commissioned by HA'ARETZ. Of all polled 56.3 percent believe that the rate of inflation will now increase, in contrast with 11.8 percent who believe it will decrease. Of all polled 49.3 percent fear economic decrees in the near future and 37.3 percent believe that a negative change will now occur in Israel's economic situation whereas 20.9 percent believe a change for the better is in the offing. Nevertheless, 41.5 percent believe no change will take place in their personal economic state. These views are prevalent among all public strata but the more advanced socioeconomic sectors are more pessimistic regarding Israel's economic condition in the near future. The poll encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 people personally interviewed in their homes throughout the country. [Text] [TA091135 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Aug 81 p 6]

ARAB FUNDS BAN--Ramallah, 9 Aug--The mayors of Judaea and Samaria predict a collapse of the municipal and services networks in view of the recent ban issued by the military government on bringing in Arab support funds from the joint Jordanian-PLO Committee. They claim that the municipalities were able to provide the local inhabitants with services due to the committee's funds only, as the military government granted the municipalities only small sums of money. The mayors, and particularly the moderate ones, expressed the hope that the military government would revoke this decision and would permit the municipalities to introduce the support funds into the area. A senior military government officer told the ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria today that the decision to ban contact with the joint Jordanian-PLO Committee will remain firm in the future as well. The military government will not allow PLO support funds into the area, "but this does not mean all Arab aid." The military government is now examining the issue from all its aspects. Other Arab personalities, mainly from the agricultural sector, argue that since the Baghdad conference, where a decision was made to set up a support fund for "the steadfastness of the inhabitants of the territories," the farmers have not enjoyed any aid from the support fund. They said that although the joint Jordanian-PLO Committee, which handles the fund, has sent some money to certain elements in the region, these did not reach the farmers. They claim that these elements took the money for themselves. [Text] [TA091402 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1345 GMT 9 Aug 81]

BRIEFS

THREATS AGAINST TRANSPORT BUREAUS--Libyan Arab maritime transport bureaus in certain countries of Europe have received terrorist threats from heinous Zionist elements wishing to carry out, through fascist methods, terrorist actions against the Jamahiriyah bureaus, in particular in large European capitals. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French 4 Aug 81 p 1]

NEW YUGOSLAV CONTRACT--Libya has granted the Yugoslav firm Energoinvest a contract to found a joint company producing aluminium and petrol-coke. Reports from London did not disclose the value of the contract. This is the third Libyan-Yugoslav deal in a month. In July, Energoprojekt of Belgrade signed a \$220 million contract for a naval academy in Tripoli and the Libyan National Bank granted Yugoslavia a \$150 million loan as balance of payments support (An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO, July 13). Earlier this year the two countries signed a trade protocol, pledging to double trade between them. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 12]

CSO: 4500/34

KINGDOM EXPANDING FLOUR MILLS

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English No 17, 7 Aug 81 p 9

[Article by Javid Hassan]

[Text]

THE KINGDOM will soon be self-sufficient in indigenous flour production with the opening of a third mill in Riyadh next month and planned increase in production capacity at Qassim, Khamis Mushayat and Jizan, said Ahmed Shinawi, director general of the Grain Silos and Floor Mills Organization.

Shinawi told *Saudi Business* last week that Riyadh, which caters to the central region, had been unable to meet the demand for flour supply. But now it will be self-sufficient with the commissioning of the third mill there with a capacity of 420 metric ton per 24 hours and another at Qassim with a capacity of 270 tons. "With these we shall be more than self-sufficient," the director general said.

The present flour supply position, according to Shinawi, is that the Eastern Province is self-sufficient in this respect, while the western and central region are lagging behind. When all the projects are completed, the total production capacity in the Kingdom will shoot up to 855,000 tons as against a demand of 650,000 tons in the next two years. (The present demand is for 600,000 tons.)

"This capacity is flexible. It can always be raised if we make it a six-day or seven-day week, depending on the demand," Shinawi said. Giving a low-down on the expansion program, he pointed out that Jeddah now requires

330,000 tons of flour while its present milling capacity is limited to 259,000 tons. However, with the addition of the flour mills at Khamis Mushayat and Jizan, the total capacity for the western region will go up to 425,000 tons.

Similarly, Riyadh at present produces less than the demand for 210,000 tons per year, a demand which has been increasing by 3.5 per cent annually. With the addition of the mills at Riyadh and Qassim, the production capacity in the Central Province will rise to 300,000 tons, based on a five-day week. Dammam, which produces 130,000 tons per year, is self-sufficient. Even so, a building is being installed for a third mill in case the production capacity has to be augmented.

The whole strategy is to build up a buffer stock of flour for six months. Toward this end the storage capacity is also being stepped up with additional 40,000-ton silos for Qassim and more grain silos at Khamis Mushayat, Riyadh and Jizan. The indigenous flour, Shinawi said, is superior to the imported, as it is enriched with iron, niacin, thiamin and riboflavin. The imported variety is not, as a laboratory test has revealed, he pointed out.

Referring to the sale of flour packets he said the organization has introduced into the market family flour packets by installing three small bag packing lines at

Riyadh, Dammam and Jeddah. Riyadh and Dammam lines have already started production and marketing of family flour. The step is a sequel to the earlier 45-kg bag flour for the bakeries, a size which was too large for housewives and resulted in substantial wastage as the flour became infested because of prolonged storage. Other include patent flour enriched in two-and-five-kg packages and whole wheat flour in two-and-five-kg packages.

"The flour in these packages is specially produced for all house baking and cooking requirements. It is of medium strength and is good for making bread, cookies and pastries," Shinawi pointed out.

The organization also meets the requirements of farmers and helps cattle and livestock development by expanding feed production for the dairy and poultry farms. Billed for commissioning next year is a feed mill with a capacity of 25 metric tons per eight hours and a seed cleaning plant with a capacity of nine tons per hour. When completed, they will provide a fillip to the growth of the farm sector which gets priority in the Kingdom's third five-year plan.

Shinawi explained all silos are "slip formed concrete" except 20,000-ton silos which are made of steel and imported from Italy. The following is a

breakdown of the distribution of silos in the Kingdom:

	Steel	Concrete
Riyadh	20,000	60,000
Dammam	20,000	60,000
Jeddah	—	120,000
Qassim	20,000	40,000
Khamis		
Mushayat	—	40,000
Total	60,000	300,000

The marketing of flour and feed is done either through direct sale from mills to customers or through the existing channels of distributors and importers. "We are also delivering our products in bulk to customers who have bins and bulk intake facilities. Besides, we use our bulk flour and feed trucks," Shinawi added.

Asked whether the storage system was plagued by any rat menace, the director general said: "Rats are not a problem in the silos as it is a complete rat proof system. Each plant has its own pest control section to check infestation and rodents in the warehouses. I would say the main problem is manpower development." This problem is being handled through the various training programs.

BRIEFS

DUTCH POULTRY PLANS--Khartoum, July 17 (SUNA)--In the domain of the Sudanese-Dutch cooperation, a number of poultry farm officials are due here this year to discuss the promotion of poultry farms in the country. The Chairman of the Sudanese-Dutch Friendship Society Baha 'al-Din Muhammad Munawar said they had prepared an integrated programme to be implemented within this year. The programme includes the invitation to hold a meeting here next December to discuss means of boosting the cultural exchange between the two friendly countries, he concluded. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 17 Jul 81 p 2]

CZECH FLOUR MILL PROJECT--Madani, July 17 (SUNA)--Central Region Governor 'Abd-al-Rahim Mahmud and the Deputy President of the Czechoslovak Technopole Firm signed here yesterday a contract to erect Rufa'ah Flour Mills project. The foreign component of the project is \$3,156,000 and the local component is Ls. 200,000, said Director of Mills Ahmad Hasan. According to the contract, the construction works will be finalized within a maximum period of 18 months. The daily productivity is targeted at 120 tons of flour per day. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 17 Jul 81 pp 2-3]

'ATBARAH CEMENT FACTORY--Khartoum, July 17 (SUNA)--The extension of 'Atbarah Cement Factory will begin production by the second half of 1982 with a maximum productivity of 236,000 tonnes per year thus bringing the overall productivity of the factory and its extension to 450,000 tonnes. Together with Rabak Cement Factory the two factories will cover 2/3 of the country's needs of cement until 1985. Work on the Ls. 24 million extension began May 1976. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 17 Jul 81 p 3]

NUBA FISH PRODUCTION--Fish production at the Nuba Lake was estimated at 700 tons for the 80/1981 season. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 18 Jul 81 p 3]

FODDER PLANT--Construction work on a fodder factory near the central region town of El Hasahiessa will be completed next September. The project is being executed by a Czech company at the cost of Ls 600,000. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 18 Jul 81 p 4]

NEW JOB CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE ANNOUNCED--Khartoum, July 20 (SUNA)--The Director of the Establishment issued circulars on the application of the second phase of the Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme (JECS). The circulars revised the items of increments and allowances with the effect of abolishing some and introducing new ones. The third phase of the Scheme will begin very soon, a reliable source said. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 20 Jul 81 pp 2-4]

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